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Duress and Loss of Control: Fear and anger in excusatory defences 
 




This article examines the role of the anger and fear emotions in the loss of control and duress 
defences and argues that, although fear is now included as a trigger in loss of control, 
priority is still given to anger as a triggering event. Furthermore, in duress, although fear is 
the overriding mental state of the duresee, it wrongly forms no part of the rationale of the 
defence at all.  
Following a brief examination of both emotions, the paper - individually with respect to each 
defence - considers issues relating to the (in)sufficiency of the objective element contained in 
the defences, specifically because neither properly take fear into account as a characteristic 
which should be attributed to the reasonable person, and then, to a lesser extent, what impact 
theoretical principles, such as mechanistic and evaluative approaches, have on the role 
emotion plays in both defences (if any). It is clear that none of these, nor indeed the relatively 
new discipline of neuroscience, examined in the penultimate section of the paper, can tell us 
about the effects of emotion on decision-making, reasoning, control and responsibility, nor 
can they provide an answer as to how emotions - fear especially - can be properly 
incorporated into both defences.  
Numerous emotion-based alternative solutions are disseminated, and although no preference 
is expressed here, it is recommended firstly, that fear should be more effectively incorporated 
into the loss of control defence and secondly, that duress should include fear as a 
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Emotions play a vital part in all aspects of our daily lives, and indeed it is probably true to say 
that they have some influence - to a greater or lesser degree - on all the decisions we make 
about the way we live, be they trivial or life-changing.2 It has been said that emotions 
‘facilitate decision making’;3 they help us to deal with problems;4 they define our goals and 
values;5 and are important to our welfare and comfort.6 In particular, some primary emotions, 
such as anger and fear, which stem from our evolutionary survival instinct, play a functional7 
role in, for example, readying us to ‘respond to challenges and opportunities … and providing 
us with information about what is important and how we are faring with respect to our 
goals’.8 
 
The anger and fear emotions also play a part (although not always explicitly), in three 
criminal law defences, notably loss of control9 (a partial defence to murder), duress (a full 
defence to all offences except murder) and self-defence (a full defence to murder). 
Traditionally, the anger emotion has most clearly been seen in the former provocation - now 
loss of control defence, albeit fear is now an additional component there. Fear is also a 
fundamental component in duress and self-defence.10 As such, not only is it imperative that 
persons charged with criminal offences should be clear as to how these emotionally-charged 
 
2 See, for example, E Y Drogin and R Marin ‘Extreme Emotional Disturbance (EED), Heat of Passion, and 
Provocation: A Jurisdprudent Science Perspective’ (2008) 36 J Psychiatry and Law 133, 139. 
3 J J Gross ‘The Emerging Field of Emotion Regulation: An Integrative View’ (1998) 2 (3) Review of Gen 
Psychology 271, 272. 
4 A H Fischer and A S R Manstead ‘Social Functions of Emotion’ in M Lewis, J M Haviland-Jones and L F 
Barrett (Eds) Handbook of Emotions (3rd Ed The Guilford Press 2008) 456. 
5 L C Charland ‘Is Mr Spock Mentally Competent? Competence to Consent and Emotion’ (1998) Philosophy, 
Psychiatry and Psychology 67, 73-5.  
6 D M Kahan and M C Nussbaum ‘Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law’ (1996) 96 (2) Columbia LR 
269, 286. 
7 i.e. that emotions have developed for a specific function; A Öhman ‘Fear and Anxiety’, and Fischer and 
Manstead, both in Handbook of Emotions (n 4) 710 and 456 respectively.   
8 Gross (n 3) ‘conclusions’. 
9 Although Herring rightly writes that while the traditional focus was on anger, ‘there is … nothing in the 
requirements of loss of control that requires the defendant to be acting out of anger’. J Herring Criminal Law. 
Text, Cases and Materials (8th Ed Oxford University Press 2018) 230. 
10 A Reilly ‘The Heart of the Matter: Emotion in Criminal Defences’ (1997-8) 29 Ottawa LR 117, 141.  
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defences apply, it is also important for all manner of social, political and legal reasons that 
the way in which the emotional elements therein are interpreted should be both transparent 
and consistent. Yet, although the law and emotion debate has been evident for the last 20 
years,11 it will be seen that there are still no firm answers which provide the criminal law with 
a coherent understanding of the emotions which not only underlie these defences, but which 
also govern the way in which individuals behave.    
 
To begin with then, this article will briefly clarify what emotions are, and what features 
pertain to the fear and anger emotions particularly, before going on to look at the loss of 
control and duress defences. While it is appreciated that there are clear differences between 
the two, which it could be argued would thus warrant a different approach, these two are 
selected for a number of reasons: Firstly, they are generally considered to be excusatory, 
while self-defence is traditionally considered to be justificatory.12  This - together with the 
absence of a need for proportionality in loss of control and duress - are the main reasons why 
self-defence will not be discussed further here. Also, as both loss of control and duress adopt 
an objective test which specifically imbues what was in the past described as the ‘reasonable 
man’ with a defendant’s characteristics, a person’s typical reaction to fear or anger is a 
characteristic which should thus, ostensibly at least, be taken into account. Thirdly, both loss 
of control and duress specifically look to ‘circumstances’ - especially that a fear of serious 
 
11 P G Nestor ‘In Defense of Free Will: Neuroscience and Criminal Responsibility’ (2019) 65 International 
Journal of Law and Psychiatry 1, 1. See, for example, S A Bandes (Ed) The Passions of Law (New York 
University Press 1999); R Grossi ‘Understanding Law and Emotion’ (2015) 7 (1) Emotion Review 55;  K 
Abrams and H Keren ‘Who’s Afraid of Law and the Emotions?’ (2009-10) 94 Minnesota LR 1997; H Petersen 
‘The Language of Emotions in the Language of Law’ in H Petersen (Ed) Love and Law in Europe (Dartmouth 
Pub. Co. 1998); C Sanger ‘Legislating with Affect: Emotion and Legislative Law Making’ in J E Fleming (Ed) 
Passions and Emotions (New York University Press 2013).  
12 See, for example, G Williams ‘The Theory of Excuses’ [1982] Crim LR 732, 734 and J Horder ‘On the 
Irrelevance of Motive in Criminal Law’ in J Horder (Ed) Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (4th series Oxford 
University Press 2000). However, this is not universally agreed. See for example, LC No. 304 Murder, 
Manslaughter and Infanticide (2006) [6.61] with regard to duress; J Dressler ‘Rethinking Heat of Passion: A 
Defense in Search of a Rationale’ (1982) 73 (2) The J of Criminal Law and Criminology 421, 448 with regard to 
provocation (as it then was) and R A Duff ‘Criminal Responsibility and Emotions: If Fear and Anger can 
Exculpate, Why not Compassion?’ (2015) 58 (2) Journal of Philosophy 189. 
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violence exists - to provide an explanation of the perpetrator’s conduct. Next, and as will be 
discussed below, both duress and loss of control are ‘concessions to human frailty’.13 Sixth, 
they both involve an element of loss of control - a specific requirement in the loss of control 
partial defence, and in the case of duress, a loss of control by the defendant as a result of the 
pressure imposed by the duressor.14 Finally, as the main aim of this article is to highlight the 
lack of regard given to the fear emotion, loss of control best demonstrates that although fear 
of serious violence is now a triggering factor in loss of control, priority is still, as it always 
has been, given to the anger emotion,15 whereas examining duress shows that although fear is 
the overriding mental state of someone who is claiming duress,16 it ironically forms no part of 
its rationale at all.17  
 
Following the brief exposition of the fear and anger emotions, the paper moves on to examine 
loss of control and while acknowledging the role of characteristics and emotions in this 
partial defence, contends that anger - its traditional basis - takes precedence over the fear 
trigger, which is not given the priority it deserves.  
 
The subsequent discussion of duress and its relevant characteristics shows that fear - its key 
component - is not taken onto account at all. In respect of both defences, this raises the 
 
13 See for example, K J Arenson ‘The Paradox of Disallowing Duress as a Defence to Murder’ (2014) 78 (1) 
JCL 65, 71; and see for example the Irish Law Commission referred to in E Spain The Role of Emotions in 
Criminal Law Defences (Cambridge University Press 2011) 186 and Lord Hailsham R v Howe [1987] 1 AC 417, 
432. Or as the Law Commission has said: it is a ‘recognition of the infirmity of human nature’. LC Working 
Paper No.55 Codification of the Criminal Law. General Principles. Defences of General Application (1974) 
[25].  
14 The essence of duress is that ‘“pressure” or duress exerted upon a party in terms of threats [amounts to] 
submission …’ J A Scutt ‘Consent versus Submission: Threats and the element of fear in Rape’ [1977] 13 (1) 
University of Western Australia LR 52. This is borne out by a definition of submission as being ‘a state in 
which people can no longer do what they want to do because they have been brought under the control of 
someone else’. Collins English Dictionary. 
15 See, for example, M J Allen ‘Provocation’s Reasonable Man: A Plea for Self-Control’ (2000) JCL 64 (2) 216, 
239; and A Clough ‘Mercy Killing: Three’s a Crowd?’ (2015) JCL 358, 359. 
16 Spain (n 13) 67, quoting Yeo. 
17 E Spain ‘Duress and Necessity in Ireland: Reform on the Horizon’ (2008) 18 (3) Irish Crim LJ 70, 71. See 
also Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law. Theory and Doctrine (7th Ed Hart Publishing 2019) 753. 
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question of the significance of the objective element and, to a lesser extent, the usefulness of 
both choice and/or character theory. What none of these do is to explain whether the 
perpetrator was capable of controlling her behaviour or of resisting the threat, or whether she 
simply chose not to exercise that capacity.  
 
One way in which it could be possible to ascertain this is via the relatively new discipline of 
neuroscience, which forms the penultimate section of this paper. While there will be a brief 
overview of some of the more recent emotion theories,18 ‘neurolaw’,19 the new ‘rapidly 
developing area of interdisciplinary research on the meaning and implications of 
neuroscience for the law and legal practices’20 will be analysed to ascertain if it is able to 
provide a means of explaining the impact these emotions have on cognitive decision-making 
and reasoning, and on a person’s ability to exercise self-control (or not) or to demonstrate 
courage (or not), in the face of very strong emotions.  
 
The conclusion reiterates that fear should be more effectively incorporated into the loss of 
control partial defence and should be a specific component of the duress defence. Some 
recommendations for emotion-based alternatives are highlighted in the conclusion. 
 
2 Defining emotion21 
 
18 So not, for example, William James; Decartes: Freud. For more details on these, see, D Keltner, K Oatley and 
J M Jenkins Understanding Emotions (3rd Ed John Wiley and Sons MA 2014); and W Lyons Emotion 
(Cambridge University Press 1980). A good summary of the various theories of emotion, and bibliography 
relating thereto can be found at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/emotion/ (accessed on 6 November 2018).   
19 See W Glannon ‘Neuroscience, Law, and Ethics’ (2019) 65 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 1, (a 
Special Issue containing a number of articles on law and neuroscience); and O D Jones, R Marois and others 
‘Law and Neuroscience’ (2013) 33 (45) 17 Journal of Neuroscience 624. 
20 G Meynen ‘Neurolaw: Neuroscience, Ethics and Law. Review Essay’ (2014) 17 Ethical Theory and Moral 
Practice 819, abstract. 
21 There are over 100 emotions listed at www.curriculumpress.edu.au/soi/downloads/TLI9_A-Z_Emotions.doc 
(accessed 19 March 2014). 
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The word emotion is based on the Latin emovere, (e meaning ‘out’ and movere meaning 
‘move’). The related term ‘motivation’ is also derived from movere. In effect, there is a 
strong link between motive and emotion, as emotions are seen to ‘motivate behaviour’.22  
 
A dictionary definition describes emotion as ‘a strong feeling deriving from one’s 
circumstances, mood or relationship with others; instinctive or intuitive feeling as 
distinguished from reasoning or knowledge’.23 However there is in reality a general 
perception among emotion theorists that it is not possible to advance a coherent definition of 
emotion,24 not least because it has such ‘fuzzy boundaries’,25 and covers such a broad range 
of experiences. As Svendsen has explained: ‘“Emotion” is a term that can cover a range of 
highly dissimilar phenomena - from pain, hunger and thirst to pride, envy and love, from the 
almost purely physiological to the almost completely cognitive’.26 
 
Despite this ambivalence, there is partial concurrence that emotions can be divided into 
certain categories. Although there is no agreement as to an exact figure,27 it has been claimed 
that there are six primary ‘innate’,28 basic or ‘simple’29 emotions. These are ‘happiness, 
 
22 Kahan and Nussbaum (n 6) 297. See the claimed re-emergence of the motive-emotion link in R M Ryan 
‘Motivation and Emotion: A New Look and Approach to Two Reemerging Fields’ (2007) 31 Motivation and 
Emotion 1.  
23 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com (accessed 6 November 2018). This is interesting for two reasons. Firstly, 
because emotion and instinct are two distinct concepts: see C Sanger ‘The Role and Reality of Emotions in 
Law’ (2001-2) 8 William and Mary J of Women and the Law 107, 108. Secondly, because of the assumption in 
the definition that emotion is separate from reasoning.  
24 See for example, J Hillman Emotion. A Comprehensive Phenomenology of Theories and their Meaning for 
Therapy (Routledge and Kegan Paul 1960) 243; and R C Solomon ‘The Philosophy of Emotions’ in Handbook 
of Emotions (n 4) 4. 
25 J J Gross ‘Emotion Regulation in Handbook of Emotions ibid, 498. 
26 L Svendsen A Philosophy of Fear (Reaktion Books 2008) 21. 
27 D Evans, Emotion: The Science of Sentiment (Oxford University Press 2001) 6. Svendsen notes that ‘[i]n an 
overview of fourteen lists of “basic emotions” it is striking that there is not one single emotion that is included 
in all lists’ ibid, 22. 
28 S Uniacke ‘Emotional Excuses’ (2007) 26 (1) Law and Philosophy 95, 99. 
29 J Bourke Fear. A Cultural History (Virago Press 2005) 8. 
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sadness, fear, anger, surprise, [and] disgust’.30 It is argued by some that we can have very 
little control over these, because our reactions to them are both reflexive and instinctive.31  
 
There are also purported secondary, ‘complex’,32 ‘developed’33 or social emotions, such as 
embarrassment, love, shame, envy, guilt, pride, jealousy, awe and horror. These have also 
been described as ‘higher cognitive emotions’34 because they involve more reflection than the 
supposedly automatic primary emotions and as such, are more liable to be swayed by our 
thoughts. Moreover, these take more time to develop and to recede than the primary 
emotions.35 Of interest here is that a number of the secondary emotions seem to derive from 
the primary passions. For example, jealousy, awe, and horror, all include features of fear,36 
while guilt, pride, envy and shame all contain elements of disgust.  
 
Finally, a third category of ‘background’ emotions, comprises emotions such as ‘well-being 
or malaise, calm or tension’.37 Although similar to moods, the latter last for longer than 
emotions; they operate in a moderate, as opposed to intense ambience and are ‘objectless, 
free- floating’.38 Contrarily, emotions tend to endure for only a short time and always have an 
intentional object;39 ‘they are always about something or other. One is always angry about 
something … one is always afraid of something’.40 If there was no object, there would be no 
 
30 A Damasio The Feeling of What Happens: Body, Emotion and the Making of Consciousness (Vintage 2000) 
50.    
31 See, for example, J Le Doux The Emotional Brain. The Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life (Phoenix 
1998) 19; and Evans (n 27) 16.  
32 Bourke (n 29) 8. 
33 Uniacke (n 28) 99. 
34 Or even ‘self-conscious emotions’ A A Baird ‘The Developmental Neuroscience of Criminal Behavior’ in 
N.A.Farahany (Ed) The Impact of Behavioral Sciences on Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 2009) 95. 
35 Evans (n 27) 28-9. 
36 Bourke (n 29) 8.  
37 Damasio (n 30) 51. Italics in original. 
38 Keltner, Oatley and Jenkins (n 18) 28. 
39 As compared to moods; R S Lazarus Emotion and Adaptation (Oxford University Press 1991) 48. 
40 Solomon (n 24) 12.  
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reason to be either fearful41 or angry.42 As a result, there is available to us an underlying 
reason for responding to the emotion; there is a causal incentive to explain why the defendant 
acted in the way he did which is open to evaluation and as to its reasonableness or 
unreasonableness.43 
 
This ‘evaluative’ view is one favoured by Kahan and Nussbaum44 in their seminal article on 
two opposing approaches to emotions, the mechanistic and the evaluative.45 The former refers 
to situations of impulse which are lacking in thought or cognition, deriving ‘from an innate 
human nature’ which impel a person to act impulsively.46 Contrarily, the evaluative view is 
associated with a cognitive appraisal of events which are open to evaluation. This holds that 
emotions (i) possess within them an assessment or appraisal of the importance or significance 
of objects and events such that actors can themselves evaluate the appropriateness of their 
emotion and their resulting actions;47 and also, by implication (ii) that they ‘can themselves 
be evaluated’ by others for their appropriateness or inappropriateness48 by judging cases of 
loss of control and duress alongside the way those emotions are typically expressed.49 
Therefore, while the evaluative view ‘can appraise the evaluations internal to the offender’s 
 
41 Svendsen (n 26) 35. 
42 S Gough ‘Taking the Heat out of Provocation’ (1999) OJLS 19 (3) 481, 489. 
43 J Gardner The Logic of Excuses and the Rationality of Emotions’ (2009) 43 (3) J of Value Inquiry 1, 42.  
44 Kahan and Nussbaum (n 6).  
45 Legal theory is very sparse as most of the vast literature is mainly of a physiological, biological, 
psychological and psychoanalytic nature, as evidenced in the writings of for example, Rorty, Le Doux and de 
Sousa. 
46 Kahan and Nussbaum (n 6) 273 and 277-9. Mackay and Mitchell suggest that ‘the reality lies somewhere in 
between’ the evaluative and mechanistic view; R D Mackay and B J Mitchell ‘But is this Provocation? Some 
Thoughts on the Law Commission’s Report on Partial Defences to Murder’ [2005] Crim LR 44, 49. Having said 
that, research does show that even the more mechanistic/impulsive emotions do involve an element of 
subconscious processing. As Davies has said: ‘despite our convictions that we consciously control our actions 
… [they] are in fact caused by lower level brain processes of which we have little or no awareness…’ P S 
Davies ‘Skepticism Concerning Human Agency: Sciences of the Self Versus Voluntariness in the Law’ in 
N.A.Vincent (Ed) Neuroscience and Legal Responsibility (Oxford University Press 2013). See also J Le Doux 
‘Coming to Terms with Fear’ (2014) 111 (8) Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 2871, and text to (n 197, n 198 and n 
219) below. 
47 i.e. that a ‘subject’s own evaluations of her situation were an essential part of her emotions …’  Kahan and 
Nussbaum (n 6) 286 and 291.  
48 ibid, 286-287. Emphasis in original.  
49 V Tadros ‘The Characters of Excuse’ (2001) 21 (3) OJLS 495, 500. 
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emotions as reasonable or not reasonable’, the mechanistic view simply permits an inquiry 
into how resilient some emotions are.50 In arguing that there is a cognitive element in 
virtually all emotions - including anger and fear - and that these are thus open to evaluation,51 
Kahan and Nussbaum have set the scene for the currently dominant evaluative/cognitive 
view.52  
 
2.1 What is fear? 53 
Fear, ‘an inevitable part of human existence’,54 is generally described as ‘an emotional 
reaction resulting from the apprehension that there is a danger about and the consequent 
desire to avoid or be rid of the danger’.55 It is a survival mechanism, designed to motivate 
behaviour to reduce any threats,56 and, as one of the earliest existing emotions, has possibly 
been around for some 500 million years.57 Consequently, we know more about this emotion 
than any other.58  
 
Physically and physiologically while in a state of fear, muscles tense up, the eyes widen and 
the body perspires, yet is cool; both the heart rate and heartbeat accelerate. Some people may 
shake, run away, scream, jump, or simply curl up59 and remain immobilized by the emotion. 
 
50 Kahan and Nussbaum (n 6) 359-361. Compare Berger on what he calls ‘normative veiling’ i.e. simply saying 
that a person’s will is overcome by emotion veils ‘the normative quality of the emotions that inform the 
decisions that people make’ and that they should, accordingly, be evaluated, B L Berger ‘Emotions and the Veil 
of Voluntarism: The Loss of Judgment in Canadian Criminal Defences’ (2005-6) 51 McGill LJ 99, 128. 
51 Kahan and Nussbaum ibid 295.  
52 See, for example, LC No.290 Report on Partial Defences to Murder (2004) [3.39].   
53 According to Campbell, the ‘5 types of fear [are] (social; agoraphobic; death and illness; sexual and 
aggressive scenes; and harmless animals’) A Campbell ‘Sex Differences in Direct Aggression: What are the 
Psychological Mediators?’ (2006) 11(3) Aggression and Violent Behavior 237, 242. 
54 Öhman (n 7) 709. 
55 Lyons (n 18) 70.  
56 Öhman (n 7) 710. 
57 Evans (n 27) 44. 
58 J Le Doux, Synaptic Self (Viking Penguin 2002) 212. Le Doux also claims that ‘[w]e have English words to 
distinguish more than three dozen variants of fear-related experiences’; Le Doux (n46). 
59 Hillman (n 24) 126; but see for example, D H Barlow, B F Chorpita and J Turovsky ‘Fear, Panic, Anxiety and 
Disorders of Emotion’ in D A Hope (Ed) Perspectives on Anxiety, Panic and Fear Vol 43 of the Nebraska 
Symposium on Motivation (Nebraska Press 1996) 289.  
10 
 
Indeed, usually, the automatic response to fear is to freeze.60 In Galenic terms, this emotion is 
blue and cold.61 
 
2. 2 What is anger?  
Anger has been defined as ‘a strong feeling of annoyance, displeasure, or hostility’;62 ‘a 
feeling of great annoyance or antagonism as the result of some real or supposed grievance’.63 
However, this does not really convey the potential severity of anger reactions in loss of 
control situations especially; indeed, this is better conveyed in its synonyms, which suggest a 
greater level of anger, described in terms of rage, wrath, outrage and fury.64 
 
When angry, one’s violent propensities are heightened and concern about one’s potential 
victim tends to diminish.65 A person can be stronger, more aware and more forceful66 when 
angry. ‘The blood “boils”, the face becomes hot, the muscles tense. There is a feeling of 
power and an impulse to strike out, to attack the source of anger … There is a strong feeling 
of impulsiveness and the “dimension of control” is lower than for any other emotion’.67 In 
contrast to fear, the usual response to anger is to fight.68 In Galenic terms, this emotion is red 
and hot.  
  
 
60 Le Doux (n 31) 176. 
61 ‘(Medicine) of or relating to Galen (Latin name Claudius Galenus ?130-?200 AD), the Greek physician, 
anatomist, and physiologist, or his teachings or methods’; found at http://www.thefreedictionary.com/Galenic 
(accessed 6 November 2018). 
62 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com (accessed 6 November 2018). 
63 http://www.collinsdictionary.com (accessed 6 November 2018). 
64 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com (accessed 6 November 2018). On anger and degrees of anger generally 
see J Horder Provocation and Responsibility (Clarendon Press 1992), and Dressler (n 12) 465. 
65 R Brandt ‘A Motivational Theory of Excuses in the Criminal Law in M L Corrado (Ed) Justification and 
Excuse in the Criminal Law. A Collection of Essays (Garland Pub. Inc.1994) 114. 
66 E A Posner ‘Law and the Emotions’ (WP 103) University of Chicago 5. 
67 Reilly (n 10) 133, quoting Izard. 
68 Gough (n 42) 487.  
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Contrasting the two emotions further, while it has been argued that ‘anger … can be an 
ethically appropriate emotion and that … it may be a sign of moral weakness or human 
coldness not to feel anger’,69 the mainstream view is that anger is perceived to be an 
inappropriate or ‘bad’ emotion;70 it is not usually perceived to be commendable, nor is it an 
emotion that we would want to encourage.71 Illustrating this and writing about loss of control 
specifically, Simester and Sullivan have observed that ‘… anger is a criminogenic emotion 
and one of the key deterrent tasks of the criminal law is to provide incentives for citizens to 
curb violent responses induced by their angry states’.72   
 
On the other hand, the fear emotion has been said to be ‘understandable … admirable’,73 
‘appropriate and justified’.74 It has been said that an emotion can be ‘appropriate’ where the 
reason for it is a good reason. As Charland illustrates, if a person came across a big bear in 
the forest, this would be a good reason for fear to be explained as both a cogent and fitting 
response.75 Thus, acting to save oneself in such a situation would be ‘a good reason to act 
which ought not to be ignored’.76 In contrast, a ‘petty affront’ would not be sufficient.77 This 
is reiterated in R v Dawes, where Lord Judge CJ said that ‘unless the circumstances are 
extremely grave, normal irritation, or even serious anger, do not often cross the threshold into 
loss of control’.78 
 
 
69  i.e. righteous anger. LC No. 290 Report on Partial Defences to Murder 2004 [3.38]. Emphasis added. 
70 See generally B Rosebury ‘On Punishing Emotions’ (2003) 16 (1) Ratio Juris 37.   
71 E Spain ‘Love in Life and Death’ (2013) 64 (1) NILQ 91, 106.   
72 Simester and Sullivan (n 17) 411. Thus raising the broader question of whether any defence based on anger or 
loss of control is acceptable; for example, Horder, referring to the then provocation defence, asked ‘whether 
[any] actions in anger are worthy of excuse’. J.Horder ‘Assisting in Suicide. Keeping the Debate Alive’ (1990) 
54 (1) JCL 253 at 255. Also see Horder (n 64). Thanks go to a reviewer for raising this broader point.  
73 J Horder ‘Cognition, Emotion, and Criminal Culpability’ (1990) LQR 469, 480. Uniacke has said that fear is a 
proper and fitting sort of emotional reaction to allow an excusatory defence; Uniacke (n 28) 101. 
74 A Norrie ‘The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 - Partial defences to Murder (1) Loss of Control’ [2010] Crim 
LR 275, 278.  
75 Charland (n 5) 77. 
76 Reilly (n 10) 145. 
77 Per Lord Millett in R v Smith (Morgan) [2001] 1 AC 146, 214. 
78 R v Dawes [2013] EWCA Crim 322 [60].  
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What we can see here then is that appropriateness is linked with the reasons for acting (taking 
us back to the link with motive) and that not only must the emotion itself be appropriate, but 
also that a person’s response or reaction to it must also be appropriate. Uniacke explains that  
 
… an emotional response is of a morally appropriate type if a morally well-disposed 
person would be justified in having that type of response to the particular 
circumstances ... A morally appropriate type of response could be one that we would 
be right to feel in particular circumstances, such that it would be morally inappropriate 
were we to feel otherwise.79 
 
Thus, while fear would be an appropriate response in situations of abuse especially, a 
response made in anger may not be appropriate. For example, Holton and Shute writing about 
the previous provocation defence said that ‘[i]t is one thing to get angry; it is another to lose 
one’s self-control … Perhaps it is justifiable to become angry in the face of provocation. But 
is it justifiable to lose one’s self-control? We think not’.80 In the same vein, Norrie, agreeing 
with the Law Commission, wrote that ‘anger cannot justify outright a violent response, 
certainly not a killing’.81  
 
Despite these clear differences in our perception of the two emotions and our reactions to 
them, it should be noted that they do nonetheless have some common features. For example, 
the impulse, or instinct, of self-preservation is a central feature of both emotions;82 in an 
 
79 ‘Lack of pity, for instance, would be callous or grossly insensitive in some circumstances’; Uniacke (n 28) 
100. 
80 R Holton and S Shute ‘Self-control in the Modern Provocation Defence’ (2007) 27 (1) OJLS 49, 70.   
81  A Norrie Crime Reason and History (3rd Ed Cambridge University Press 2014) 312 and LC No. 173 LCCP 
Partial Defences to Murder (2003) [4.165]. 
82 Posner (n 66) 16.  
13 
 
anger situation fighting, or other like hostile behaviour can be seen as key to survival,83 as 
acting in duress is, if the individual’s life is threatened.84 In addition, they are both primary 
(and negative) emotions the responses to which may, to a degree, be reflexive, instinctive and 
reactive.85  
 
3 The loss of control partial defence   
In a series of papers in 2003,86 200487 and 2006,88 the Law Commission reviewed the law on 
provocation and excessive use of force in self-defence, (the latter in the context of providing 
a defence which did not discriminate against women who killed abusive partners, as 
provocation was deemed to do). In particular, and following criticism of the emphasis on 
anger as its focal point, it noted in its 2003 Consultation Paper, Partial Defences to Murder, 
that ‘[t]he defence of provocation elevates the emotion of sudden anger above the emotions 
of fear, despair, compassion and empathy, [and asked itself whether it was] morally 
sustainable for … anger to found a partial defence to murder’. In response, it concluded that 
there was an argument that it was not.89 Furthermore, the Law Commission had also 
recommended that the need for a loss of control be dispensed with,90 but this was rejected 




83 Lyons (n 18) 41. 
84 For example, the Law Commission said ‘The law must recognize that the instinct and perhaps the duty of self-
preservation is powerful and natural …’ LC No. 304 Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (2006) [6.64]. 
85 See, for example, R G Fontaine ‘The Wrongfulness of Wrongly interpreting Wrongfulness: Provocation 
Interpretational Bias and Heat of Passion Homicide’ 79. http://works.bepress.com/reid_fontaine/11/ 
(accessed 6 November 2018). 
86 LCCP No.173 Partial Defences to Murder (2003). 
87 LC No. 290 Report on Partial Defences to Murder (2004), and indeed in LCCP No.177 A New Homicide Act 
for England and Wales? (2005). 
88 LC No. 304 Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (2006). 
89 LCCP No.173 Partial Defences to Murder (2003) [4.164].  
90 LC No. 290 Report on Partial Defences to Murder (2004) [1.13]. See, for example, B Mitchell ‘Loss of Self-
control Under the Criminal Justice Act 2009: Oh No!’ in A Reed and M Bohlander (Eds) Loss of Control and 
Diminished Responsibility. Domestic, Comparative and International Perspectives (Ashgate Pub. Ltd 2011) 50.  
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With these issues in mind, the Government subsequently acknowledged that ignoring the 
impact of fear in provocation was problematic and as a result, the defence now contains a 
new ‘fear of serious violence’ ‘trigger’, although the Ministry of Justice itself conceded that 
‘it is not helpful for killings which are triggered primarily by fear to be shoehorned into a 
partial defence which is aimed at killings triggered by anger’.91  
 
The provisions are contained in sections 54 and 55 Coroners and Justice Act 2009, which 
state that: 
 
s54 “(1) Where a person (“D”) kills or is a party to the killing of another (“V”), D is 
not to be convicted of murder if –  
(a) D’s acts and omissions in doing or being a party to the killing resulted from the 
D’s loss of self-control, 
(b) the loss of self-control had a qualifying trigger, and  
(c) a person of D’s sex and age, with a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint 
and in the circumstances of D, might have reacted in the same or in a similar way to D 
…92 
s55 “(2) A loss of control had a qualifying trigger if subsection (3), (4) or (5) applies. 
(3) This subsection applies if D’s loss of self-control was attributable to D’s fear of 
serious violence from V against D or another identified person. 
(4) This subsection applies if D’s loss of self-control was attributable to a thing or 
things done or said (or both) which –  
 
91 Ministry of Justice CP19/08 Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide: Proposals for Reform of the Law (2008) 
[27]. 
92 S54 (2) and (3) continue: “2) For the purposes of subsection (1) (a), it does not matter whether or not the loss 
of control was sudden. 
(3) In subsection (1) (c) the reference to “the circumstances of D” is a reference to all of D’s circumstances 




(a) constituted circumstances of an extremely grave character, and  
(b) caused D to have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged …” 
 
The Ministry of Justice explained that 
 
‘Whichever of these qualifying triggers applies, a number of factors must be present 
for the defence to succeed.  
The first is that a person with certain characteristics might have acted in the same or 
similar way to the defendant. These characteristics are that: (i) they were of the same 
sex and age as the defendant; (ii) they had an ordinary level of tolerance and self-
restraint; and (iii) they were in the same circumstances of the defendant …’93 
 
3. 1 Emotions and character(istics) in loss of control 
As can be seen then, the relevant characteristics to be ascribed in loss of control are sex and 
age, tolerance and self-restraint,94 and circumstances.95 However, this is slightly misleading, 
because for the purposes of the objective test, it must be noted that whereas a defendant’s 
characteristics can be ascribed for the purposes of the gravity of the provocation, only age 




93 Ministry of Justice Circular 2010/13 ‘Partial defences to murder: Loss of control and diminished 
responsibility; and infanticide. Implementation of Sections 52, 54 to 57 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009’ (4 
October 2010) [16] and [17].  
94 The allusion to self-restraint recognizes that there is an expectation that people will exercise self-control. 
Herring (n 9) 240. Loss of control does not have to be absolute; see, for example, Lord Diplock in Phillips v The 
Queen [1969] 2 AC 130 cited in LC No. 290 Report on Partial Defences to Murder (2004) [3.27] on ‘degrees’ 
of control. 
95 On circumstances especially, see C Withey ‘Loss of Control, Loss of Opportunity?’ [2011] Crim LR 263, 
273-4.  
96 The same applied in the old provocation defence: AG for Jersey v Holley [2005] UKPC 23. 
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This distinction has been criticised most especially by Yeo on the basis that the rationale for 
the defence, and the rationale for the objective test are two different things. According to 
Yeo, the rationale for the defence ‘may be seen as the law’s concession to human frailty…’ 
[or] ‘that the accused was not fully in control of her or his behaviour when the homicide was 
committed’. However, the rationale for the objective test is ‘the perceived need “for society 
to maintain objective standards of behaviour for the protection of human life”’. As such, the 
objective test rationale  
 
bears no conceivable relationship with the underlying rationale of the defence [which 
do not] require the distinction to be made between characteristics of the accused 
affecting the gravity of the provocation from those concerned with the power of self-
control.97 
 
It is a truism to say that the capacity for exercising self-control obviously differs as between 
different people, and while for example, anger/fear management training98 or emotion 
regulation99 can be effective in training some individuals100 to control their emotions,101 some 
 
97 S Yeo ‘Power of Self-control in Provocation and Automatism’ (1992) 14 Sydney LR 3, 4 and 8. 
98 These consist of ‘behavioral, cognitive, attentional, physiological, or emotional strategies to eliminate, 
maintain, or change emotional experience and/or expression’. L R Brody and J A Hall ‘Gender and Emotion in 
Context’ in Handbook of Emotions (n 4) 400. 
99 ‘Emotion regulation studies how individuals influence which emotions they have, when they have them, and 
how they experience and express them’. Gross (n 3) abstract. 
100 Such as, say, police officers; firemen and soldiers. See for example, M Baron ‘Excuses, Excuses’(2007) 1 
Crim Law and Philosophy 21, 23; See generally (2004) 17 (1) Social Research: An international Quarterly of 
the Social Sciences (special ‘Courage’ issue); H V Hall ‘Extreme Emotion’ (1990) 12 U Hawaii L Rev 39; and 
M D Bayles ‘Reconceptualising Necessity and Duress’ in Corrado (n 65) 449. Grossman describes the 
‘conditioning’ enforced on soldiers before going into battle, while Rachman uses bomb disposal experts (and 
astronauts) as examples of this; D Grossman On Killing. The Psychological Cost of Learning to kill in War and 
Society (Little, Brown and Co. 1995); S J Rachman ‘Fear and Courage: A Psychological Perspective’ in 
Courage issue 158-9. See also Morse’s list of ‘variables’ that assist us in maintaining control; S J Morse 
‘Culpability and Control’ (1993-4) 142 U Pa L Rev 1587, 1605-1610. 
101 See, for example, Morse ibid. In effect, this suggests that we are not talking about the emotion itself, but 
rather, a person’s reaction to it. See text to (n 79) above. As Reilly has said, ‘[a]lthough actors might have no 
control over the arousal of emotion, they have a significant level of control over how to deal with the feelings 
invoked. The translation of anger into aggression is a matter of choice’ (n 10) 133. Compare J Sabini and M 
Silver ‘Emotions, Responsibility and Character’ in F Schoeman, Responsibility, Character and the Emotions 
(Cambridge University Press 1987) 169 (summarising Kant’s view on emotions). On controlling emotions, see, 
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people will still be prone to reacting more aggressively than others.102 This is no doubt one 
reason why characteristics cannot be ascribed to the person with a normal degree of tolerance 
and self-restraint in relation to the capacity for control, but does this mean that an inability to 
control oneself because one is angry, is (or is not) a reflection of one’s character?103  
 
On the one hand Reilly has said that an angry reaction does reveal a person’s character, 
because ‘[t]he person of good character has control over his or her emotional reactions …’104 
while on the other hand, character theory tells us that even though the defendant was acting 
unlawfully, this was not a reflection of her character.105 Tadros explains that this is because, 
in relying on reasons which are different to those that would normally motivate her, the actor 
is acting in a way which is distinct from her normal behaviour: 
 
Her character while she is in a state of extreme anger is not like her character whilst 
calm … But … this is so only if the settled character of the agent is peaceful. If it is 
not, then she cannot show the difference between her settled character and her 
outraged character that provides the basis of the defence.106 
 
 
for example, Holton and Shute (n 80), and ‘The Art of Self-Control’ at 
http://www.svpvril.com/Ingalese/ingalese4.html (accessed 6 November 2018). 
102 B Mitchell ‘Provoked Violence, Capacity and Criminal responsibility’ (1995) 1 Psychology, Crime and Law 
291, 296.  
103 J T Parry ‘The Virtue of Necessity: Reshaping Culpability and the Rule of Law’ (1999) 36 Houst LR 397, 
423-6. G Williams ‘Necessity: Duress of Circumstances or Moral Involuntariness?’ (2014) 43 1 Common Law 
World Review 1, 23. 
104 Reilly (n 10) 132. N Levy and T Bayne ‘A Will of One’s Own: Consciousness, Control and Character’ 
(2004) 27 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 459, 468: ‘it will remain true that some individuals will 
have less will power than others do through no fault of their own’. 
105 Tadros notes this (n 49) 495.  
106 Tadros ibid, 507 and more generally in Criminal Responsibility (Oxford University Press 2007), Chapter 11. 
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This points towards some interesting philosophies about the effect of emotion on loss of 
control,107 whereby it is argued that the provoked person is still capable of reasoning,108 but 
her perspective is changed such that she prioritises reasons for action that would normally 
have remained marginal, rather than relying on reasons that would usually influence her. 
Posner best explains this as follows: 
Emotions … have a certain feel or affect characterized usually by a focus on particular 
stimulus with the result that the rest of the environment “fades” (a little or a lot, 
depending on the strength of the emotion) … [During the emotion state] people 
continue to act rationally [albeit] differently from the way they do in the calm state … 
people experience … temporary variations in their preferences, abilities, and/or 
beliefs. 
Their preferences change so that what psychologists call the “action tendency” of an 
emotion becomes relatively attractive. The action tendency of anger is to strike out; so 
we can say that a person, while angry, develops a temporary preference to strike the 
person who offends him … a person in an emotional state does not act irrationally 
given his temporary preferences … [in contrast] fear produces flight from a threat.109 
 
It can be seen then that there is a disparity between the anger and fear reactions, and that the 
latter is not a reaction customarily associated with losing self-control.110 In line with the 
typical responses to anger and fear noted earlier, the former characteristically manifests itself 
as a violent expression of rage, whereas the latter ‘might be characterised by very different 
 
107 By, for example, Gough (n 42) 481 and 488, and G Mousourakis ‘Emotion, Choice and the Rationale of the 
Provocation Defence’ (1999) 30 Cambrian LR 21, 23. 
108 In R v Jewell the Court of Appeal accepted that loss of control meant ‘a loss of normal powers of reasoning’ 
[2014] EWCA Crim 414 [23]; Emphasis added. 
109 Posner (n 66) 3-5. Compare Holton and Shute (n 80) 52 and 55: ‘What is lost when one loses self-control is 
control over which mental elements [and ‘immediate inclinations’] drive one’s actions’. 
110 Mitchell (n 90) 47. 
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external signs which are not easily detectable: typically a state of paralysis and submission’111 
or as noted by Posner, a flight reaction, none of which relate to the notion of loss of control.  
 
This therefore speaks directly to the question as to whether it was necessary to keep the loss 
of control requirement in the defence. When the Law Commission recommended dispensing 
with it, Mackay and Mitchell argued that the loss of control prerequisite went to the very 
heart of the defence, because it had to be caused by ‘extreme emotional disturbance’ on the 
defendant’s part. Abolishing loss of control would thus ignore the defendant’s mental 
condition in a situation where it was precisely that which caused him to lose his self-control 
in the first place.112  
 
Contrarily however, and agreeing with the Law Commission, Carline noted that: 
[t]he essence of the defence is fear and thus the law should not also require the 
defendant to suffer a loss of self control … If the Government consider that it is 
important to abolish the word ‘provocation’ because of its negative connotations it is 
difficult to understand why the same does not apply to the phrase loss of self control, 
which connotes anger as opposed to fear and desperation.113 
 
This must be right. If we are saying that loss of control is an emotion-based defence and that 
allowances are given for reactions carried out as a result of emotions felt at the time the 
offence was committed, then why the need for an additional requirement in the form of loss 
of control which does not ‘fit’ with the fear emotion? The Government’s explanation that it 
needed to be retained in order to prevent its use in cold-blooded killings is fair enough, but 
 
111 Reilly (n 10) 137. 
112 Mackay and Mitchell (n 46) 47.  
113 A Carline ‘Reforming Provocation; Perspectives from the Law Commission and the Government’ [2009] 2 
Web JCLI; http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2009/issue2/carline2.html  
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this does prioritise that one form of killing at the expense of others, such as those committed 
as a result of domestic violence for example, which could legitimately be claimed on an 
emotional rationale,114 a rationale the Government clearly wanted to avoid. 
  
However, that criticism aside, and despite its welcome inclusion in the partial defence, it is 
also clear for other reasons that the fear trigger does not have the force of anger in loss of 
control. 
 
Firstly, the conditions for satisfying the triggers are unequal. This is made evident by Susan 
Edwards who explains that 
 
Fear … is only a necessary condition, it is not a sufficient condition and is qualified 
not by “extremely grave circumstances”, as is the anger defence, but specifically by 
the fear of “serious violence” … so … the evidential requirement is more stringent and 
more specific than the anger qualifying trigger … The state of anger must follow on 
from extremely grave circumstances whilst the state of fear must flow from serious 
violence. In addition, extremely grave circumstances can include any circumstances, 
whilst there is one precondition to the fear defence, that of “serious violence”.115 
 
Secondly, the fear-loss of control trigger incorporates excessive use of force in self-defence. 
The Law Commission decided (and the Government agreed) that, rather than have a separate 
defence of excessive force, this should be integrated into the loss of control partial defence, 
which would accordingly cover cases of overreaction to a fear of serious violence, where (i) 
excessive force is used, and (ii) the attack was not imminent enough to amount to self-
 
114 More will be said in this point when looking at the Model Penal Code (MPC) in the Conclusion.  
115 S S M Edwards ‘Loss of Self-Control: When his Anger is Worth More Than Her Fear’ in Reed and 
Bohlander (n 90) at 91.  
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defence.116 One of the implications of this is that whereas fear is seen as an overreaction, 
anger is not. This is because the fear trigger accommodates cases where the defendant could 
not use self-defence because the amount of force used was unreasonably excessive. So, while 
on the one hand, the fear trigger makes it easier for an abused person to take advantage of the 
defence, on the other, it fails to appreciate that hers is not an overreaction, and neither is it 
excessive.117 On the contrary, and as Reilly has argued, the fear she felt was, for her, an 
endorsement of the reasonableness of her self-defensive conduct.118  
 
Thirdly, fear of serious violence and how it affects a person’s behaviour within the context of 
abuse in particular, is a situation with which the average juror will not be familiar.119 This 
makes it even more difficult to fit fear into the loss of control requirement and to compare it 
with the reaction of a person with a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint.  
 
4 The Duress Defence120 
It seems that in England and Wales, there are now two forms of duress - duress by threats, 
and duress of circumstances. They are both common law defences, but not to murder. This 
has been the subject of much debate, and much to-ing and fro-ing on the part of the Law 
Commission,121 which in 2006 eventually reverted to its original recommendation that duress 
 
116 LC No. 290 Report on Partial Defences to Murder (2004) [4.17], and LC No. 304 Murder, Manslaughter 
and Infanticide [5.53-5]. Emphasis added. 
117 The point is made by Edwards (n 115) 234. 
118 Reilly (n 10) at 141. For further reading on the ‘reasonableness of killing’ see, for example W Wilson ‘The 
Structure of Criminal Defences’ [2005] Crim LR 108, 117: ‘Killing, even in justified anger, is the antithesis of 
reasonableness’ and LCCP No. 173 Partial Defences to Murder (2003) [4.162]: Provocation ‘raises the question 
whether a reasonable person should ever respond to provocation by killing’.   
119 L Claydon and C Rödiger ‘Fear, Loss of Control and Cognitive Neuroscience’ (2016) 22 (2) European 
Journal of Current Legal Issues, or as Loveless writes, one of the fundamental problems is ‘general ignorance of 
the psychological effects of domestic violence’ J Loveless ‘Domestic Violence, Coercion and Duress’ [2010] 
Crim LR (2) 93, 100.  
120 For a more detailed exposition of this duress section and of some of the points made below, see Williams (n 
103) especially 9; 11; 19-20; and 22. 
121 LC Working Paper No.55 Codification of the Criminal Law. General Principles. Defences of General 
Application (1974) [25], recommended that it should be defence to murder. Likewise, in its 1977 Criminal Law. 
Report on Defences of General Application (LC No. 83) [2.42]. LC No.177 Criminal Law. A Criminal Code for 
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should be a full defence to murder (and attempted murder)122 on a rationale previously 
expressed, that no ‘social purpose is served by requiring the law to prescribe … standards of 
determination and heroism’123 that were unattainable. The Government did not take the Law 
Commission’s duress proposals forward in its 2008 Consultation Paper on Murder, 
Manslaughter and Infanticide: Proposals for Reform of the Law; it simply did not look at 
duress, focusing only on provocation, diminished responsibility, complicity and 
infanticide.124  
 
To satisfy duress by threats, the defendant must demonstrate that he committed the crime as a 
result of threats of death or grievous bodily harm and that a reasonable person sharing the 
characteristics of the defendant would have acted as he did.125 Duress of circumstances 
provides a defence where the defendant reasonably believes that the circumstances are such 
that unless he or she commits a crime he or she or another will suffer death or serious injury 
and that ‘a sober person of reasonable firmness, sharing the characteristics of the accused 
[would] have responded ... as [he did]’.126 Thus it can be seen that ‘[t]he first limb is 
concerned with the nature of D’s fear and the seriousness of the threat [while] [t]he second 
involves an evaluation of the reasonableness of response’.127  
 
4. 1 Emotions and character(istics) in duress 
 
England and Wales (1989)  [12.13] Vol 2 recommended that it NOT be a defence to murder (because of Howe). 
In LCCP No.122 Legislating the Criminal Code. Offences Against the Person and General Principles (1992) 
[18.14], it reverted back to a full defence. It maintained this view in LC No. 218 Legislating the Criminal Code. 
Offences Against the Person and General Principles. Cmnd 2370 (1993) [29.14]. By 2005, in LCCP No. 177 A 
New Homicide Act for England and Wales? [1.42], it was recommending that duress should only reduce first to 
second degree murder.   
122 LC No. 304 Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (2006) [6.21].  
123 LC No. 83 Report on Defences of General Application (1977) [2.43]. 
124 Ministry of Justice CP19/08 ‘Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide: Proposals for Reform of the Law’ (July 
2008) [7] and [8]. 
125 Herring (n 9) 643. See R v Graham [1982] 1 WLR 294 confirmed in R v Hasan [2005] UKHL 22. 
126 R v Martin [1989] 1 All ER 652 per Simon Brown J 654. 
127 Loveless (n 119) 96. 
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In duress, the relevant characteristic to be taken into account is courage128/firmness129 in the 
face of threats ‘to life and limb’130 because the overriding mental state of the individual being 
threatened is fear.131 As a person who possesses courage is one who is able to overcome 
fear,132 the link between fear and courage is thus clearly made,133 yet this is not attributed to 
the reasonable man in the objective test at all. Indeed, Duff has contended that the reasonable 
man should be credited with ‘any of this defendant’s actual characteristics that affected his 
response to the threat, other than characteristics which involve or reveal a lack of … proper 
courage’.134 
 
There are three problems with this. Firstly, there is an unrealistic assumption that a minimum 
standard of courage is expected of all individuals.135 For example, in R v Horne136 and in R v 
Bowen137 it was held that any emotional characteristics such as vulnerability or susceptibility 
to threats suffered by the defendant should not be ascribed to the reasonable person nor be 
taken into account in the objective test. As Virgo has commented, the fact that Bowen’s ‘low 
intelligence’ and that he was ‘more pliable, vulnerable, timid or susceptible to the threats … 
did not make him less courageous than the reasonable person’.138 The same could be said of 
coerced victims of domestic violence highlighted by Loveless. In an argument similar to that 
propounded by Susan Edwards on loss of control and domestic violence noted earlier, 
 
128 See for example, G Virgo ‘Are the Defences of Provocation, Duress and Self-defence Consistent?’ (2002) 4 
Arch News 4 ‘the function of this objective test is to impose a test of courage …’ 
129 K J M Smith ‘Duress and Steadfastness: In Pursuit of the Unintelligible’ (1999) 363, 372. 
130 D Pears ‘The Anatomy of Courage’ Special ‘Courage’ issue (n 100) 6 and 7. 
131 Spain (n 13) 67, quoting Yeo.   
132 G Kateb ‘Courage as a Virtue’ in Special ‘Courage’ issue (n 100) 43. Courage is defined as the ‘mental or 
moral strength to … withstand danger, fear, or difficulty’ http://www.merriam-webster.com/ (accessed 6 
November 2018). 
133 Pears (n 130) 7. 
134 A Duff ‘Choice, Character and Criminal Liability’ (1993) 12 (4) Law and Philosophy 345, 359. Emphasis 
added. 
135 See for example, J Gardner ‘The Gist of Excuses’ (1997-8) 1 Buff Crim LR 575; Berger (n 50); J Dressler 
‘Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching for its Proper Limits’ in Corrado (n 65)  
381. 
136 R v Horne [1994] Crim LR 584, 585. 
137 R v Bowen [1996] 4 All ER 837, 844. 
138 Virgo (n 128). 
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Loveless argues that because fear will always be present, it should be acknowledged in the 
subjective element of the test ‘that victims of violence have a greater sensitivity to the risks in 
their environment than would be obvious to an observer’ and that the objective element  
 
does not accommodate one whose ability to resist a threat is lower than that of a 
reasonable person … The relevance of this is that an abused woman who has [chosen 
to remain] with her abusive partner … is likely to be regarded as weak, submissive 
and vulnerable in the absence of any relevant characteristic.139 
 
Secondly, in any event, the standard expected is not simply that of the reasonable man.140 
Rather, it is one of heroism.141 This can be seen in Lord Coleridge and Lord Hailsham’s dicta 
in R v Dudley and Stephens,142 and in R v Howe143 respectively, to the effect that a reasonable 
person must heroically sacrifice his life for others. Reilly has criticised Hailsham’s judgment 
because when he decided the defendants were cowards, he took them out of their social 
context and instead, imposed his own point of view which was that of a war veteran. By 
doing so, he ‘fails to understand that emotion is not a biological phenomenon which can be 
assessed objectively regardless of the circumstances, but a socially constructed entity specific 
to a particular context’. On that basis, it was correct that he was criticised as to the 
 
139 Loveless (n 119) 98-9. Loveless argues elsewhere that duress should be extended to include coercion in the 
context of domestic violence; J Loveless ‘R v GAC: Battered Woman “Syndromization”’ [2014] 9 Crim LR 
655, 662. 
140 Defined as an ordinary citizen; ‘a hypothetical person in society who exercises average care, skill, and 
judgment in conduct’. http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Reasonable+Person (accessed 6 November 
2018). For more on the reasonable person, see for example, G P Fletcher Rethinking Criminal Law (Little, 
Brown & Co, 1978) 247; V Nourse ‘After the Reasonable Man: Getting over the Subjectivity/Objectivity 
Question’ (2008) 11 New Crim LR 33; and P Westen ‘Individualizing the Reasonable Person in Criminal Law’ 
(2008) 2 Crim Law and Philosophy 137. 
141 This is a claim made by both R A Duff, ‘Virtue, Vice and Criminal Liability: Do We Want an Aristotlian 
Criminal Law?’ (2002-3) 6 Buff Crim LR 147 his n 48 and D Pascoe, Thesis (ANU) ‘Murder and the Defence 
of Necessity’ (2007) 16 referencing Yeo in ‘Necessity under the Griffith Code and the Common Law (1991) 15 
Crim LJ 17, 36. 
142 Per Lord Coleridge in R v Dudley and Stephens (1884) 14 QBD 273 at 287. Criticised by Norrie (n 81) 157.   
143 R v Howe [1987] 1 AC 417, 432. See criticism of this by E Colvin ‘Ordinary and Reasonable People: The 
Design of Objective Tests of Criminal Responsibility’ (2001) 27 Monash ULR 197, 214. 
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inappropriateness of comparing people trained to deal with fear with the reasonable person.144 
Such a standard is set too high;145 is unachievable;146 and requires people to act contrary to 
their natural instinct of self-preservation.147  
 
Thirdly - and perhaps this is the most logical argument - as the rationale of the duress defence 
is that it seeks to excuse a perpetrator who gave in to a threat to which others of reasonable 
fortitude would have done likewise,148 it must be asked how it can be just to punish a 
defendant for doing precisely what the reasonable person would have done? Simester and 
Sullivan have rightly observed that ‘… there will be occasions when we would expect even a 
person of reasonable firmness to be coerced into participating in murder …’149 and as the 
Law Commission noted in its 2006 Report, ‘[l]ittle, if any, blame may attach to someone’s 
decision to take part in a killing under duress’.150 Indeed, the Law Commission quoted Elias J 
in the case of R v Hasan where he stated that defendants acting under duress ‘are being 
punished for giving way to what will often be enormous fear and wholly understandable 
human frailty’. 151 Indeed, in the same case in the House of Lords, Lord Bingham said that the 
argument for extending the defence to murder was logically, ‘irresistible’, while Baroness 
Hale acknowledged both sides of the duress coin when she said on the one hand that she ‘did 
not understand why the defendant’s beliefs and personal characteristics are not morally 
relevant to whether she could reasonably have been expected to resist’ while on the other, she 
 
144 Reilly (n 10) 148 and 149 and see also J Gardner ‘Justifications and Reasons’ in A P Simester and A T H 
Smith (Eds) Harm and Culpability (Clarendon Press 1996) 121; and the Special ‘Courage’ issue (n 100). 
145 A Noti, ‘The Uplifted Knife: Morality, Justification and the Choice-of-evils Doctrine’ (2003) 78 NYUL Rev 
1859, 1886. 
146 F Leverick ‘Defending Self-defence’ (2007) 27 OJLS 563, 570; Noti ibid, 1886. 
147 M Kremnitzer ‘Proportionality and the Psychotic Aggressor: Another view’ (1983) 18 Israel LR 178, 201. 
148 S M H Yeo ‘Proportionality in Criminal Defences’ (1988) 12 Crim LJ 211, 219; S H Kadish ‘Excusing 
Crime’ (1987) 75 California LR 257, and A Brudner ‘A Theory of Necessity’ (1987) 7 (3) OJLS 339 are just 
three who have made this point. 
149 And went on to say that excluding murder and attempted murder from the duress defence is ‘too rigid’; 
Simester and Sullivan (n 17) 805.  
150 LC No. 304 Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (2006) [1.54]. 
151 ibid [6.51]. 
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accepted ‘that even the person with a knife at her back has a choice of whether or not to do as 
the knifeman says’.152 
 
In these brief quotations, Bingham and Hale identify three of the problematic issues in the 
duress defence:  
(1) Extending the defence to murder; 
(2) that characteristics are relevant to the capacity to resist; 
(3) that the duressee has a choice of whether to comply with the threat or not.  
 
(1) Baroness Hale picked up on Lord Bingham’s comment on extending the duress defence 
when she noted that the Law Commission had ‘sold out to subjectivism’ when it 
recommended in its 2006 Report on Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide, that duress 
‘should be a full defence to … murder and attempted murder’. At that time, the Law 
Commission had said it was ‘wrong even in respect of murder to condemn the defendant for 
not acting heroically rather than reasonably …’153 
 
In essence, there are two separate points here - subjectivism - and the argument for a full 
defence. The latter is not the main focus of this article, but one possible bone of contention 
with the latter is that permitting duress as a full defence to murder would lead to an acquittal, 
and not, as is the case in the partial defence of loss of control, to a conviction for 
manslaughter. This would then seemingly give fear - which goes to the very heart of duress154 
- a superior excusatory authority than anger (and fear) in loss of control.155  
 
 
152 R v Hasan [2005] 2 WLR 709 per Lord Bingham [21] and per Baroness Hale [73].  
153 LC No. 304 Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (2006) [6.21]. 
154 Loveless (n 139) 663.  
155 Reilly (n 10) 146. 
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Subjectivisation of course, goes to the heart of the objective test, the purpose of which, it has 
been said, is to specifically ‘impose a test of courage’.156 i.e. the reasonable person is created 
to epitomize a typical member of society;157 he/she  
 
embodies a reasonable level of courage demanded of all citizens [and as such] makes 
no concessions to those who are more “pliant” or susceptible to threats … [There is a] 
universal expectation … that the law is to be observed. [As Lord Lane said:] it was “a 
matter of public policy … to limit the defence … by means of an objective criterion 
formulated in terms of reasonableness”.158  
 
This means that the law deals with everyone in the same way, even though we are not the 
same.159 Some of the reasons for this are that the objective standard ‘is intended to hold 
persons up to a desirable standard of conduct’ in order to improve their behavior which, as a 
consequence, also benefits society; that the law cannot take into account all of the quirks 
from which people suffer; and that it would be hard pressed for the legal system to determine 
the exact capabilities of every person.160 The undeniable contrary argument to this is that if 
the law ascribed all of the defendant’s characteristic to the reasonable person, then there 
would be no point to having an objective test, as it would be totally negated.161  
 
An obvious criticism of refusing to admit characteristics is that it is unfair for a person who 
may be unusually susceptible and who is simply incapable of resisting the threats, to be 
 
156 Virgo (n 128). 
157 L Dahan-Katz ‘The Implications of Heuristics and Biases. Research on Moral and Legal Responsibility’ in 
Vincent (n 46) 149. 
158 Smith (n 129) 370. 
159 C Bublitz and R Merkel ‘Guilty Minds in Washed Brains’ in Vincent (n 46) 366. See also N.A.Vincent 
‘Enhancing Responsibility’ in Vincent (n 46) 318. 
160 Dahan-Katz (n 157) 149 and 150. 
161 A slightly different version of this can be seen in Smith (n129) 366. 
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judged according to the objective standard.162 Virgo goes on to say that this ‘misses the key 
point. Such a characteristic is not relevant because it contradicts the rationale of the objective 
test which seeks to determine the boundaries of courage’.163 As was noted above, this is in 
fact a standard of heroism which is very often unachievable even by the hypothetical 
reasonable person.164 
 
(2) Virgo’s comment refers to defendants who are incapable of resisting the threats. This 
leads to the second point as expressed by Baroness Hale above - that she did not understand 
why the defendant’s beliefs and personal characteristics are not morally relevant to whether 
she could reasonably have been expected to resist. The issue with this is that - as will be seen 
in the neuroscience section below - it is not possible to ascertain whether the perpetrator was 
indeed not capable of resisting the threat because he was so fear-struck that he/she could not 
see any choice other than to comply165 or whether he was capable, but chose not to exercise 
that capacity at the time. If the former, Tadros has argued that where the perpetrator is ‘so 
overwhelmed by fear’ and it is clear that he could not achieve a higher standard of courage 
than he did, then the duress defence should be available. Contrarily, ‘[i]f an agent has the 
capacity for courage … but chooses not to act courageously on this occasion … then the 
defendant has no excuse’.166 It should be noted at this stage that although neuroscience 
cannot provide an answer to this conundrum, it is nonetheless known that a person’s reaction 
to fear operates at a conscious and subconscious level.167 Put together with the fact that fear is 
 
162 Virgo (n 128). 
163 Virgo ibid. 
164 See text to (n 141), and the Law Commission, text to (n 153) above. 
165 Reilly (n 10) 146. What Fischer and Ravizza call ‘irresistible fear’, J M Fischer and M Ravizza 
Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (Cambridge University Press 1998) 82. 
166 Tadros (n 106) 314- 315.   
167 See (n 46) above.  
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subjective and dependant on the situation, and that its effects will differ as between every 
individual, it is still documented that ‘the ability to control [the fear reaction] is limited’.168   
 
(3) Tadros refers to the perpetrators ‘choice’, as Baroness Hale does when she states that 
‘even the person with a knife at her back has a choice of whether or not to do as the knifeman 
says’.  
This takes us logically to the difficult third point above - that the duressee has a choice of 
whether to comply with the threat or not - and to a very brief exposition of choice and 
character theory which are at odds with each other in the context of duress and to an extent, 
loss of control also, but which are also relevant to the element of control present in both 
defences.  
 
As was noted in the introduction, both duress and loss of control are excusatory, rather than 
justificatory. Traditionally, justification focuses on what the perpetrator did, his choice of 
action, without taking into account any personal characteristics he possesses, while excuse 
focuses on the perpetrator’s characteristics.169 i.e. the former is compatible with the choice 
theory, where individuals are seen as being responsible for their conduct if it is freely chosen, 
but where such conduct would be excused where it is not.170 Contrarily, character theory 
looks to features of the perpetrator’s character, the ‘fixed or stable aspects of an agent’s 
psychological make-up’ and not on whether his behaviour followed the normative 
paradigm.171 It would seem therefore that loss of control and duress fit into character theory, 
as the test for both involves ascription of character, albeit to a limited extent. However, 
 
168 Claydon and Rödiger (n 119), referring to Damasio and Le Doux’s research.  
169 B McSherry ‘Criminal Responsibility, “Fleeting” States of Mental Impairment, and the Power of Self-
control’ (2004) 27 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 445, 453. 
170 C Finkelstein ‘Excuses and Dispositions in Criminal Law’ (2002) 6 Buffalo Criminal LR Special issue: The 
New Culpability: Motive, Character and Emotion in Criminal Law 317, 319. 
171 Finkelstein ibid, 324. The capacity theory may also be relevant in loss of control insofar as it refers to a 
person ‘who lacks the capacity to restrain his emotions’ Finkelstein, 330. 
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academic discourse has shown that, strangely, choice theory may be appropriate to the duress 
defence because the perpetrator does have a choice, albeit it is a restricted one.172 If we return 
to Loveless’ exposition on domestic violence and duress, she points out that 
 
Staying with a violent partner … should not imply freedom of choice or autonomy. 
Her choices are determined by her duressor … The very real risk is that her response 
to violence for which she bears no responsibility is likely to be regarded as 
unreasonable whatever she does. What is socially acceptable “fortitude” in a 
relationship where violence is endemic and choices curtailed?173 
 
Loveless goes on to say that the victim’s choices are constrained because she is ‘controlled 
by the duressor’174 and it is this notion of control which links duress, and indeed loss of 
control, with the ascription of responsibility because both defences are based on the principle 
that no one should be criminally liable for crimes committed as a consequence of influences 
outside of their control.175 
 
In law, it is recognised that responsibility relies upon the fact that the perpetrator acts 
voluntarily and has the freedom or control to choose a course of action. i.e. there is an 
alternative course of action that is available to him and that he is free to make a choice as 
which course of action he pursues.176 In this, he needs to be acting voluntarily because 
voluntariness is a prerequisite of responsibility. In duress the duressee is not acting 
 
172 Simester and Sullivan (n 17) 812. See also Smith’s choice account of duress in Smith (n 129). 
173 Loveless (n 119) 100. 
174 ibid, 96. 
175 Arenson (n 13) 67, although his focus is on duress and necessity alone. Or, as Levy and Bayne have written, 
‘[c]ontrol is a necessary condition for moral responsibility’; Levy and Bayne (n 104) 465. Or as stated  by M 
Pardo and D Patterson in Minds, Brains and Law: The Conceptual Foundations of Law and Neuroscience 
(Oxford University Press 2013) 37: ‘A brain must be “in control” for a human being to make choices. That 
cannot be disputed’. Or see Fischer and Ravizza (n 165) 17. 
176 Fischer and Ravizza ibid, 20. 
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voluntarily, nor does he have the genuine freedom of choosing a course of action because, in 
fear of the imposed threat, he is controlled by the duressor.177 Even if he is responsible, he 
should not be found to be culpable because he was acting under duress.178 Similarly, in loss 
of control, the role of the partial defence reflects the fact that the perpetrator does not 
completely meet the requirements needed to be held responsible and this includes his 
capacity to control his behaviour.179 
 
However, it is not as straightforward as this because although in both duress and loss of 
control, the defendant is acting in circumstances engendering significant stress and powerful 
emotions,180 in duress, the defendant is expected to try and resist his fear181 and choose death, 
while in loss of control (and  in provocation, as it then was), where the defendant is angry, he 
is seen to be unable to choose. This has been interpreted as evidence of the disparity in the 
degree of control expected of a person who is acting out of fear as opposed to one acting out 
of anger.182 Thus, as Dressler has elaborated:  
 
With duress, only Actor’s choice-opportunities are reduced. As such, we demand that 
the unlucky Actor accept his unenviable choices, and make the morally “right” 
decision … he is capable of making such a decision. 
In provocation cases, however … Our common experience informs us that anger 
affects choice-capabilities, not mere opportunities. Anger makes us less able to 
respond in [an] appropriate fashion.183 
 
 
177 Loveless (n 139) 663: ‘If the threat is, or is believed to be, violent, control will be maintained by fear …’ 
178 Fischer and Ravizza (n 165) 83. 
179 K Sifferd ‘Translating Scientific Evidence into the Language of the “Folk”’ in Vincent (n 46) 186.  
180 Yeo (n 148) 211. 
181 Uniacke (n 28) 111. 
182 See for example, Reilly (n 10). 
183 Dressler (n 12) 463-464. Emphasis in original. 
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So, the argument is that if the defendant is angry, he is considered to be incapable of making 
a choice, but if he is afraid, he is considered to be capable of making a choice. Reilly, points 
to one of Lord Hailsham’s dicta in Howe, in which the latter also highlights the division 
‘between anger under provocation which is based in affect, and fear under duress which is 
based in cognition’. As Reilly notes, the consequence of this is that Lord Hailsham 
recognises that a duressee’s cognitive capacity to resist killing is greater in a situation of 
duress than it is in what was provocation184 (now loss of control). For Lord Hailsham, the 
clue for the distinction lies in the difference between affect and cognition. As was seen 
earlier, the cognitive view of emotion holds that the actor can assess the importance or 
significance of events and can himself evaluate the appropriateness of the emotion. This 
includes fear, but also - according to Kahan and Nussbaum - anger also. However, Lord 
Hailsham places anger into the noncognitive theory of emotion185 and to the affectivist 
approach i.e. that anger in loss of control ‘is the result of uncontrollable, biological, 
physiological and neurological changes within the actor’.186 Finkelstein agrees with this 
approach saying that loss of control cases ‘at least involve an altered psychological condition’ 
and that as such, the partial defence fits into the capacity theory.187 It will be recalled that this 
refers to a perpetrator in loss of control who ‘lacks the capacity to restrain his emotions’.188 
Spain in the same vein, also argues that loss of control is ‘linked to a mechanistic 
understanding of emotion’; that is, that anger in particular, is both uncontrollable, and not 
 
184 Reilly (n 10) 147. Emphasis added. 
185 ‘Non-cognitive theories are those that defend the claim that judgments or appraisals are not part of the 
emotion process. Hence, the disagreement between the cognitive and the non-cognitive positions primarily 
entails the early part of the emotion process. The concern is what intervenes between the perception of a 
stimulus and the emotion response. The non-cognitive position is that the emotion response directly follows the 
perception of a relevant stimulus. Thus, instead of any sort of evaluation or judgment about the stimulus, the 
early part of the emotion process is thought to be reflex-like’. http://www.iep.utm.edu/emotion/#SH4b (accessed 
18 March 2016). This would seem to be akin to the mechanistic theory. 
186 Reilly (n 10) 131.  
187 Finkelstein (n 170) 334. 
188 Finkelstein ibid, 330. See (n 170) above.  
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open to evaluation.189 On the other side, and agreeing with Kahan and Nussbaum, the Law 
Commission stated that ‘[t]he emotion aroused in the provoked contains a cognitive 
component, viz. the belief that the provoked has been wronged by the provoker’.190  
 
It would seem then that dividing the two emotions in this way does not provide a definitive 
answer as to why more is expected from the fearful perpetrator in duress than from the 
angered perpetrator in loss of control. However, perhaps a second dictum from Lord 
Hailsham in Howe, will assist. In addition to the distinction he highlighted between affect and 
cognition noted above, he also went on to say:  
 
[p]rovocation … is a concession to human frailty due to the extent that even a 
reasonable man may, under sufficient provocation temporarily lose his self control 
[sic] towards the person who has provoked him enough. Duress … is a concession to 
human frailty in that it allows a reasonable man to make a conscious choice between 
the reality of the immediate threat and what he may reasonably regard as the lesser of 
two evils.191  
 
This dictum recognises that both defences are a concession to human frailty, but that the basis 
for that concession is different. In provocation/loss of control it is because it is accepted that a 
reasonable man can lose his self-control. This is simply a given without any further 
explanation and goes to the question raised earlier in the duress section as to the justness of 
punishing a defendant for doing what the reasonable person would have done. The difference 
is, of course that he has a partial defence to murder in loss of control, whereas no defence at 
 
189 Spain (n 13) 17. 
190 LC No. 290 Report on Partial Defences to Murder (2004) [3.39]. Emphasis added. 
191 R v Howe [1987] AC 417; see Arenson’s very interesting discourse on this (n 13) 70-71. 
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all is available to the duressee in murder, but if there was, it would result in a complete 
acquittal.  
 
In contrast and according to Lord Hailsham, the basis of the concession to human frailty in 
duress is that it allows a reasonable man to make a choice between two evils, one involving 
his breaking the law and the other some evil to himself or others. The balance between two 
evils is traditionally perceived as a justificatory notion, and has, in recent years been used to 
justify ‘killing’ in the context of necessity,192 most notably Re A (Children) (Conjoined 
twins).193 As a rule, however, killing another is not considered to ever be the lesser of two 
evils,194 and it must be assumed that this is what Lord Hailsham was rather obtusely referring 
to. Furthermore, and as has been seen, duress is an excuse and not a justification. Secondly, 
the criteria for duress does not require a balancing of two evils. Thirdly, the court in Howe 
relied on R v Dudley and Stephens as authority for holding that necessity/duress was not a 
defence to murder, but Dudley and Stephens was certainly not decided on the basis of the 
lesser of two evils; if it had been, the defendants would not have been convicted. 
 
Having said all that, it should be emphasised that Lord Hailsham’s dictum regarding the 
different bases of the concession to human frailty does not in point of fact explain why the 
perpetrator in duress has a choice, but the perpetrator in loss of control does not. The only 
possible answer lies in a statement made earlier, that the ‘dimension of control’ is lower when 
angry than it is for any other emotion, including fear.195 Indeed, Holton and Shute, writing 
before the changes to provocation implemented in the Coroners and Justice Act, wrote that 
 
192 It has been argued that necessity and duress of circumstances are one and the same. They are not. See, for 
example, Commentary on R v Jones (Margaret) [2005] QB 259 (CA) by D Ormerod in [2005] Crim LR 122.  
193 Re A (Children) (Conjoined twins: Surgical Separation) [2000] 4 All ER 961. 
194 This goes to proportionality, an element of justificatory necessity.  
195 See text to (n 67) above. 
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anger extinguishes self-control.196 The reason why fear is not perceived in the same way is 
because very often, people’s responses to fear operate at the subconscious level so that there 
is ‘less conscious control of their behaviour’ when fearful.197 When this happens, the reaction 
is instinctive, and tends not to involve a ‘conscious thought process’.198 Although patently 
treated differently in legal terms, Claydon and Rödiger suggest that responses to both these 
emotions are ‘almost indistinguishable’ and that both evidence from medicine and 
neuroscience suggest that ‘there is no scientifically objective measure for the effective 
separation of anger and fear’.199  This is not borne out by the descriptions of the two emotions 
set out earlier.  
 
That neuroscientific study cannot conclusively show changes to the brain which would 
explain the way in which anger and fear are differently perceived in the law, is unfortunate, 
but as a relatively recent literature review has shown,200 other than a brief discourse on 
capacity to resist, neuroscientific studies have tended to focus more generally on 
responsibility and determinism. However, that limitation aside, as a relatively new scientific 
method which could provide evidence of whether a legitimate excuse existed or not,201 
neuroscience is relevant here because it can ascertain whether a person has the capacity to 
make a decision and consequently, if that person can or should be held responsible.202  It can 
also ‘suggest new ways of looking at both the content and application of our concepts’203 
especially relevant where emotional mental states can lead to an understanding of the reasons 
 
196 Holton and Shute (n 80). 
197 Le Doux (n 46). Emphasis added. 
198 Claydon and Rödiger (n 119). 
199 Claydon and Rödiger ibid. 
200 F X Shen ‘Law and Neuroscience’ (2016) 48 Ariz St LJ 1043. 
201 S J Morse and W T Newsome ‘Criminal Responsibility, Criminal Competence, and Prediction of Criminal 
Behavior’ in S J Morse and A L Roskies (Eds) A Primer on Criminal Law and Neuroscience (Oxford University 
Press 2013) 153 and 155. 
202 See for example, Sifferd (n 179) 185; and Pardo and Patterson (n 175) 134. 
203 A R Mackor ‘What can Neurosciences Say About Responsibility?’ in Vincent (n 46) 76. 
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why a person acted as she did i.e. people’s behaviour ‘cannot be understood if [mental states] 
are excluded.’204 
 
5 The potential impact of neuroscientific study 
In the 1990’s the term ‘neurolaw’ was devised as a way of describing the links between law 
and neuroscience.205 Similarly, the term ‘neurolegalist’ has been used to describe researchers 
who claim that ‘scientific data about the brain can illuminate or transform law and legal 
issues’.206  
 
Neuroscientific studies, the relevance of which have, quite rightly, become more evident in 
law during the last 15 years or so,207 focus to a large extent on the way in which brain 
functions determine the way people behave and react, and on whether it can be conclusively 
proved that our behaviour is predetermined. An examination of the neuroscientific literature 
however, shows a clear divide between those who, on the one hand advocate determinism and 
who argue ‘that free will is an illusion’, that no one is really answerable for his actions208 and 
that the criminal law should be changed accordingly.209 On the other hand there are those 
who ‘hold that given current scientific knowledge, there is no need to revise the law and its 
 
204 Morse and Newsome (n 201) 152. 
205 J Chandler ‘Neurolaw and Neuroethics’ (2018) 27 CQHE 590 ‘conclusion’. See text to (n 19). 
206 Pardo and Patterson (n 175) xxvi. 
207 See generally M Freeman (Ed) Law and Neuroscience. Current Legal Issues Vol 13 (Oxford University 
Press 2011); S Zeki and O Goodenough Law and the Brain (Oxford University Press 2006); B Garland (Ed) 
Neuroscience and the Law. Brain, Mind and the Scales of Justice (Dana Press 2004); M Freeman and O R 
Goodenough (Eds) Law, Mind and Brain (Ashgate 2009); and N A Farahany (Ed) The Impact of Behavioral 
Sciences on Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 2009). 
208 Meynen (n 20) 820. 
209 For example, Sapolsky, Greene and Cohen, and Davies. As such, it could be potentially ‘destabilizing’; 
Abrams and Keren (n 11) 2026, and see the scenarios propounded by Sapolsky, and Greene and Cohen in Zeki 
and Goodenough (n 207). 
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basic concepts’210 and because, in any event, ‘[i]ncreased knowledge about brain chemistry 
will not answer normative questions about responsibility’.211 
 
This then is the first domain where neuroscience could potentially be a useful tool i.e. to 
assist in the ascription of responsibility.212 Another issue is the ‘outstanding problem’,213 of 
whether neuroscience can tell us whether a person simply did not have the necessary 
tolerance or restraint (loss of control) or courage (duress), or whether he did, but chose not to 
exercise it.214 A third - linked - issue is one of timing. Looking more closely at the current 
state of neuroscience and its examination of the effect of characteristic-type emotions on the 
brain, it would appear that it cannot resolve any of these issues. 
 
As far as the brain is concerned then, the Pre-Frontal Cortex (PFC) is ‘considered [to be] the 
controlling mechanism [which keeps] our emotions in check’.215 It ‘regulates the inhibition of 
impulses’216 by sending messages to the limbic system, especially the amygdala.217 The latter 
is the section of the brain which governs emotions such as fear and anger.218 Numerous 
studies show that damage to the PFC might make it hard for a person to control his conduct219 
and that this, in turn, could lead not only to more impulsive, but also to more violent, 
behaviour220 but there is nothing to indicate that this is as a result of an inability to exercise 
 
210 Meynen (n 20) 820. Emphasis added. Such as Morse, Michael Moore and, Pardo and Patterson.  
211 Pardo and Patterson (n 175) 39. Similarly, Mackor (n 203) 57, and Shen (n 200). 
212 See, for example Sifferd (n 179) 184: ‘Neuroscience provides substantial new and valuable information for 
determining criminal responsibility’. 
213 Levy and Bayne (n 104) 468.  
214 See, in relation to duress text to (n 165-167) above.  
215 B J Grey ‘Neuroscience and Emotional Harm in Tort’ in Freeman (n 207) 214. 
216 W Glannon ‘What Neuroscience Can (and Cannot) Tell us About Criminal Responsibility’ in Freeman ibid, 
17. 
217 The ‘emotion centre’ Grey (n 215) 214. See in particular Le Doux (n 58) 288. 
218 Glannon (n 216) 17; and R M Sapolsky ‘The Frontal Cortex and the Criminal Justice System’ in Zeki and 
Goodenough (n 207) 235-8. As noted by Svendsen ‘… people with damage to the amygdala are unable to feel 
fear’. Svendsen (n 26) 26. 
219 Glannon ibid, 20. 
220 A L Roskies and W Sinnett-Armstrong ‘Brain Images as Evidence in the Criminal Law’ and M Freeman 
‘Introduction: Law and the Brain’ in Freeman (n 207) 112 and 4-5 respectively. 
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self-control or simply because of a choice by the actor not to exercise self-control.221 
However, this is not definitive,222 possibly because some of the studies have been relatively 
small.  
 
Results of neuroscientific studies to date suggest that it is also not possible to demonstrate 
that all actions are predetermined.223 There are essentially four reasons for this: The first is 
because the majority of studies demonstrate only ‘correlations rather than causation’.224At the 
moment, neuroscience simply does not have a way of determining whether a person ‘lacked 
the capacity to refrain from performing a criminal act or had this capacity but failed to 
exercise it’.225 Therefore, looking to the ‘brain alone does not provide a satisfactory 
explanation of our actions ...’226 and there is no conclusive evidence that the brain governs or 
causes behaviour. In fact, Pardo and Patterson go further than this and opine that ‘… 
neuroscience [is limited in that it] cannot tell us where the brain thinks, believes, knows, 
intends, or makes decisions. People (not brains) think, believe, know, intend and make 
decisions’.227 
 
Linked with this, the second reason is that, irrespective of its cause, any weakness in the 
capacity to control behaviour does not in itself excuse or mitigate that behaviour. This is 
because the law is only interested in the actual mental state, and not what caused it.228  
 
 
221 Freeman in Freeman ibid, 6. Although see Pardo and Patterson (n 175) 123-4 on this point.  
222 Roskies and Sinnett-Armstrong (n 220) 112. 
223 E Aharoni and others ‘Can Neurological Evidence Help Courts Assess Criminal Responsibility? Lessons 
from Law and Neuroscience’ (2008) 1124 Annals of the NY Academy of Sciences 145, 147.   
224 Aharoni ibid and A L Roskies ‘Brain Imaging Techniques’ in Morse and Roskies (n 201) 68.  
225 Glannon (n 19) 2. 
226 Glannon ibid, 2. 
227 Pardo and Patterson (n 175) 46. 
228 S J Morse ‘Lost in Translation? An Essay on Law and Neuroscience’ in Freeman (n 207) 531. 
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Thirdly, it must be remembered that behaviour is subject to the self-evident fact that each 
individual will respond in a different way to the same emotional stimuli. One reason for this 
is that emotions are not just natural biological phenomena; rather, they are influenced by the 
way we have been brought up and educated, and by our experiences; social norms; 
environment; culture; chance; genetics, heredity229 and other outside factors.230 This is why it 
is so problematic to reconcile emotional reactions with the behaviour of the reasonable 
person, and to comply with both the objective test231 and the norms associated with criminal 
responsibility. Because our brains are able to adapt to external influences, we are not 
constrained by one set of predetermined outcomes.232 If this was not so, then no one would be 
responsible for anything. 
 
The final reason then relates to the notion of legal responsibility. This is a normative 
paradigm constructed by society, whereby a person’s conduct is measured against this 
hypothetical person of the defendant’s sex and age (loss of control) or the sober person of 
reasonable firmness (duress).233 It has been said that 
 
Neuroscience will never find the brain correlate of responsibility, because this is 
something we ascribe to humans, not to brains … psychiatrists … might be able to tell 
us what someone’s mental state … is without being able to tell us … when someone 
has too little control to be held responsible. The issue of responsibility … is a social 
 
229 See, for example, Rosebury (n 70) 39; and C E Izard and E A Youngstrom ‘The Activation and Regulation of 
Fear and Anxiety’ in Hope (n 59) 31.  
230 See N A Farahany and J E Coleman JR ‘Genetics, Neuroscience and Criminal Responsibility’ and B Garland 
and M S Frankel ‘Considering Convergence: A Policy Dialogue about Behavioural Genetics, Neuroscience and 
Law’ in Farahany (n 207). 
231 A Reilly ‘Loss of Self-control in Provocation’ (1997-8) 21 (6) Crim LJ 320, 326.  
232 M Belcher and A L Roskies ‘Neuroscience Basics’ in Morse and Roskies (n 201) 34. See also both Vincent 
in Vincent (n 159) 4 and S J Morse ‘Common Criminal Law and Compatibilism’ in Vincent (n 46) 39.  
233 Farahany and Coleman (n 230) 240. 
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choice … the idea of responsibility is a social construct and exists in the rules of the 
society.234  
 
The final unresolvable issues relates to the ‘time machine’ problem.235 In other words, 
neuroscience is unable to tell us what a defendant’s state of mind was at the time the offence 
was committed, because ‘[n]euroimaging can take place only after a crime has occurred. It is 
impossible to study the defendant’s brain state at the time of the actual crime (in the past). 
Therefore, what actually happened at the moment of the crime in a defendant’s brain is not 
directly accessible to neuroimaging findings after the crime’. 236 Put another way, ‘[t]oday’s 
brain is not yesterday’s brain’.237  
 
Thus although neuroscience has contributed to the study of emotion by providing new 
avenues of investigation238 and different inroads into legal principles and practice, any such 
inroads will be both rare and uncertain for the conceivable future.239 As Aharoni concedes, 
‘[n]euroscience is much more limited in the kinds of conclusions it can support than the 
public, the legal system, and many neuroscientists would like to acknowledge’.240 Thus, 
although academics such as Mitchell and Mackay have long argued that more ‘effort should 
… be made … to have regard to what psychologists and psychiatrists have discovered about 
 
234 M S Gazzaniga and M S Steven ‘Free Will in the Twenty First Century. A Discussion of Neuroscience and 
the Law in Garland (n 207) 68. Likewise, Aharoni (n 223) 145-6.   
235 H T Greely ‘Mind Reading, Neuroscience and the Law’ in Morse and Roskies (n 201) 120.  
236 G Meynen ‘A Neurolaw Perspective on Psychiatric Assessments of Criminal Responsibility: Decision-
making, Mental Disorder, and the Brain’ (2013) 36 (2) Int J Law Psychiatry 93, 96-7. 
237 Roskies in Morse and Roskies (n 224) 70. Timing would not, of course, be so relevant where the perpetrator 
suffered from a permanent mental disorder. A broader and different question would there be whether such a 
person should be held criminally responsible more generally. I am grateful to the reviewer who raised this point. 
Notably, most of the research carried out has been on persons with permanent, as opposed to, transient, 
dysfunctions. See for example, A L Glenn and A Raine ‘Ethical Issues’ in A L Glenn Psychopathy: An 
Introduction to Biological Findings and their Implications (New York University Press 2016); Morse and 
Roskies (n 201) 247; Levy and Bayne (n 104); Nestor (n 11) and Meynen ibid. 
238 Reilly (n 10) 126. 
239 Morse (n 228) 529. 
240 Aharoni (n 223) 158.  
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the ways in which emotions affect our mental states and our behaviour’241 disappointingly, 
and currently at least, it seems that neuroscience is unable to convey any information that will 
contest the law as it stands;242 rather, it is ‘simply the most recent candidate … for explaining 
behavior deterministically … it adds nothing new’.243  
 
Conceivably however, in time, neuroscience might develop sufficiently to be able to discover 
more about a perpetrator’s ability to resist, such that there would be evidence to support the 
use of the defences where an individual can truly show that his characteristics prevented him 
from being able to resist.244 
 
 
6 Conclusion  
More generally, research into emotions, neuroscience and the law since the beginning of the 
century245 has made a substantial contribution to the way we think about emotions and the 
law. For example, Sanger, Bandes and Grossi’s research has focused on the role and impact 
of emotions in the law, in law-making and on people who work in the law.246 Sanger lists 
incidents where emotions play a part in our daily activities and gives examples of where 
emotion has resulted in ‘a spate of laws, which are not only motivated by emotion, but 
include as part of their scheme some emotive component’.247  
 
 
241 Mackay and Mitchell (n 46) 49. In contrast, see LC No. 290 Report on Partial Defences to Murder (2004) 
[3.28]. 
242 J Greene and J Cohen ‘For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything’ in Zeki and 
Goodenough (n 207) 224. 
243 Morse and Newsome (n 201) 153. 
244 A L Roskies and S J Morse ‘Neuroscience and the Law: Looking Forward’ in Morse and Roskies (n 201) 
247.  
245 Nestor (n 11) 1. 
246 See (n 11) above.  
247 e.g. Megan’s law; Sanger (n 11) 110. See also Abrams and Keren (n 11) 2060. 
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More specifically, it has been seen that the law does recognise that emotions play an essential 
role in effective and rational decision-making248 and that anger and fear, the focus of this 
piece, influence the defendant’s reasons for acting249 and affects their subsequent behaviour, 
in a different way. It is ironic then, that despite the pervasiveness of fear in these criminal 
defences its role there remains ‘ambivalent’250 - we have seen that fear has been introduced 
into the loss of control partial defence, where it does not ‘fit,’ and where, in any event, it is 
not given the same priority as anger. Contrarily, it has not been introduced into duress, a 
defence which does not even acknowledge the fear that a threat engenders, although it is 
evident that fear affects, and motivates, the way in which an offender responds to the threat, 
and where it would therefore ‘fit.’ i.e. fear should specifically be referred to as part of the 
rationale for the duress defence.  
 
As to loss of control, it has been seen here that anger has a different effect on an actor as 
compared to fear and as such, the way in which fear has been accommodated in the loss of 
control partial defence does not do it justice. The partial defence, as its predecessor did before 
it,251 still expects individuals to suffer a loss of control. However, although the partial defence 
is dependent upon a loss of control arising as a result of some emotional turmoil, the 
emotional turmoil giving rise to the loss of control is not its defining feature: that falls to the 




248 Damasio (n 30) 40, and Abrams and Keren ibid, 2004. 
249 Tadros (n 106) 305.  
250 Reilly (n 10) 121. 
251 Per Lord Hoffman in R v Smith (Morgan) [2001] 1 AC 146, 173, noted in LCCP No. 173 Partial Defences to 
Murder (2003) [1.40], and Lowe [2003] EWCA Crim 677, noted in LC No. 290 Report on Partial Defences to 
Murder (2004) [3.117]. 
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Had the loss of control requirement been abolished, as was recommended by the Law 
Commission,252 there would perhaps have been a better opportunity to consider emotion-
based alternatives as a basis for the defence, such as, for example the provisions on 
‘extraordinary emergency’ referred to in s25 of the Criminal Codes of Queensland and 
Western Australia (the Griffith Code),253 or the notion of ‘extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance’ as referred to in Clause 210.3. (1) (b) of the Model Penal Code (MPC). The 
latter provides that: 
 
[A] homicide which would otherwise be murder [is manslaughter when it] is 
committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which 
there is reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of such explanation or 
excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor’s situation 
under the circumstances as he believes them to be.  
 
The Law Commission considered this in its 2004 Report on Partial Defences, noting that 
while a number of US states (‘reform states’) had adopted the clause,254 some had omitted the 
‘actor’s situation’ formulation contained in the second sentence. In line with that, Professor 
Sanford Kadish in an interesting Report written for the Law Commission advised that the 
‘actor’s situation’ formulation should be rejected for a number of reasons, not least because it 
was not consistent with the rationale of the partial defence.255 However he commented that 
‘the EED formulation … is a felicitous and useful improvement over the traditional 
formulation … [which] hits the nail on the head in asking whether there is reasonable 
explanation or excuse for the mental disturbance, since in these cases the basis of the 
 
252 LC No. 290 Report on Partial Defences to Murder (2004) [3.115]. 
253 See S M H Yeo ‘Necessity under the Griffith Code and the Common Law’ (1991) 15 Crim LJ 17, and Pascoe 
(n 141).  
254 LC No. 290 Report on Partial Defences to Murder (2004) [3.50]. 
255 Appendix F, LC No. 290 Report on Partial Defences to Murder (2004) [20 – 23].  
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mitigation is precisely the emotional disturbance … this part of the MPC proposal has it 
right’.256 Despite this endorsement however, the Law Commission ultimately rejected the test 
as being unduly ‘vague and indiscriminate’ preferring instead that ‘the defendant had 
legitimate ground to feel seriously wronged by the person at whom his or her conduct was 
aimed’ as the basis of the defence.257  
 
As to duress, Eimear Spain has staunchly advocated an emotion-based excusatory duress 
defence based on a ‘reasonable emotional response’ whereby the moral quality of the 
emotion and the individual’s response to it could and should be evaluated.258 According to 
Spain, the test could be that ‘a reasonable person sharing the characteristics of the accused 
would have experienced fear in the circumstances’ i.e. the jury would have to decide 
‘whether the fear experienced by the defendant (and subsequent action) was morally 
appropriate’.259 The same test could be applied to loss of control.260  
 
A further alternative incorporating both defences (due to their categorisation as excuses) has 
been advocated by Claire Finkelstein. She opts for what she calls ‘rational excuses’. These 
‘straddle the line between traditional excuses and justifications’ neither of which she claims 
are really appropriate. Rather,  
 
rational excuses exonerate because they are cases in which the agent acts on the basis 
of … an “adaptive disposition,” namely a disposition that enhances the welfare of the 
 
256 ibid [14]. i.e. omitting the word ‘mental’ from the formulation, (preferring simply ‘extreme emotional 
disturbance (EED). See Mitchell and MacKay above, text to (n 112). 
257 LC No.290 Report on Partial Defences to Murder (2004) [3.59]. 
258 Spain (n 13) 264, 268-270. Contrast Nourse who argues against an objective requirement of reasonableness; 
V Nourse ‘Passions’s Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defence’ (1996-7) Yale LJ 1331. 
259 This would be excusatory and not a justificatory/lesser evils defence. Spain ibid, 264 and see 272-3.  




agent who cultivates it and makes possible collective welfare improvements. The law 
is interested in promoting and rewarding such dispositions, because there will be 
mutual gains from their adoption if members of society generally possess them.261 
 
One element of this is the recognition that characteristics should be taken into account, 
although Finkelstein’s main point is that, unlike traditional character theory, she argues that 
the basis of the permitting an excusatory defence is to excuse when the agent acts ‘out of 
character’ rather than acting in character, because the former is ‘most chosen’, and reflects 
when he is at his most responsible.262  
 
To sum up then, no preference is expressed here as to which option is favoured except to say 
that firstly, it is recommended that in loss of control, the fear emotion should be more 
properly incorporated into the defence such that it more effectively includes those whom it 
was intended to protect, (such as, for example, victims of domestic abuse, but not limited to 
that class).263 As it stands, the defence currently makes killing out of anger more defensible 
than killing out of fear.264 This wrongly clings to the old (and now defunct) notion of honour 
from whence the anger derived and upon which the previous partial defence of provocation 
was based,265 but it is also noted here that anger is not even specifically named as a trigger in 
the current defence definition.  
 
 
261 Finkelstein (n 170) 320-321.  
262 Finkelstein ibid, 343. Emphasis in original. This is very much like the view expressed by Tadros above at 
text to (n 106).  
263 See, for example Loveless (n 139) 662. 
264 See for example, Allen (n 15) 241-2. 
265 See (n 9); (n 15); Dressler (n 12); Gough (n 42); and Allen ibid. 
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Secondly, the duress defence should take into account the fear emotion, which is, after all, its 
key component. As it stands, the defence in its current form is too strict266 in denying the 
defence to those who cannot help that they are not courageous or heroic enough. Perhaps it is 
time to put duress on an equal footing with loss of control, not least on the basis that a person 
who kills under duress is significantly less blameworthy than one who kills as a result of loss 
of control. 267 
 
The recommendations are thus founded on the arguments made here that fear is an 
appropriate emotion.268 Both recommendations clearly advocate fear-centered reasoning as a 
basis for both defences. What part the objective reasonableness element of the defences 
should continue to play has been briefly questioned.269 We know that the hypothetical 
reasonable person is a ‘figure constructed to represent a standard member of society’270 the 
purpose of whom is to ensure that everyone complies with societal norms, whether they have 
the capacity to do so or not.271 Views on this rely on how committed we are to adhering to 
universal standards of conduct and/or being more open to the more subjective consideration 




266 Simester and Sullivan (n 17) 805.  
267 Arenson (n 13). He claims that the difference between the two defences presents a ‘gross imbalance’; it 
demonstrates ‘an indefensible and strange dichotomy’; it is ‘one of the most longstanding and obvious 
paradoxes in the criminal law’ 77, 78 and 74 respectively.  
268 Text to (n 73-81). 
269 Indirectly on pp14-15 for loss of control and more specifically for duress on pp25-26, especially text to (n 
161).  
270 Dahan-Katz (n 157) 149. See (n 118); (n 140) and text to (n 156-161) above.  
271 Dahan-Katz ibid, 149; Bublitz and Merkel (n 159) 362. 
